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REPORT
Number 26-September 1978

Property Tax Assessment:
A Century-Long Struggle For Structured Discretion
by
Teresa Olcott Cohea*

"Broad discretion and judgment
lie at the very core of the property tax."
For the past 100 years, the history of property tax
assessment in Montana has been a series of legislative and
administrative efforts to limit and structure county
assessors' discretion. The history of these efforts, which
included legislation, constitutional amendments, court
decisions, and administrative rule-making, is instructive
since it provides a well-documented case study of how a vital
state function involving great discretion can be made
predictable and open to citizens.
Property tax assessment is an excellent subject for
studying discretion, since it requires assessors to make
complex decisions on the characteristics and comparability
of widely varying types of property. The Montana Supreme
Court has consistently recognized the need for judgment and
expertise in assessment and has been hesitant to substitute its
judgment for that of an assessor:
(the) court will ordinarily not interfere with the action of ...
(assessors) to correct mere errors of judgment. It is only when they act
fraudulently or maliciously, or the error or mistake is so gross as to ?e
inconsistent with any exercise of honest judgment, that courts will
grant relief.
(Danforth v. Livingston, 23 Mont. 558, 59P.916,917 (1900)

The legislature must rely on the expertise and judgment of
assessors since the procedure for assessing every type of
property in the state can hardly be written into statute, even
if legislators or their draftsmen had the expertise to do so:
new varieties of property appear, values rise, and complex
formulas for depreciation must be developed. Moreover,
assessors can determine the best method of assessing
property on a case-by-case basis, which the legislature cannot do through statute. Clearly, assessors must have some
degree of discretion in order to perform their duties.
However, far too much discretion can be delegated to or
seized by assessors. If clear legislative standards and
administrative procedures guide assessors' work, then their
discretion may be limited to a ministerial or non-policy level
. *Teresa Cohea is a Legislative Researcher on the staff of the Montana
Legislative Council, Helena, MT. Her responsibilities include those of S_taff
Researcher, Revenue Oversight Committee, and Coal Tax Oversight
Committee.

designed to implement legislative policies. In Montana,
however, clear standards and procedures were absent or
ignored for most of the last century and .assessors exercised
discretionary authority of the highest order, making policy
decisions of a most sensitive nature. Their discretionary
authority at times surpassed that wielded by the legislature.
The importance of structuring such discretion is obvious.
Assessors determine the appraised or assessed value to which
the statutory tax rates and the locally determined mill levies
are applied. Their decisions touch all property-owning
citizens and have a direct economic effect on their lives. If
their decisions are based on unwritten standards that are in
direct conflict with state law and, further, their assessments
are often lowered on a case-by-case basis by individual
taxpayers' pressure, citizens are unprotected by U.S.
constitutional requirements of due process and equal
protection and Montana constitutional requirements for
uniform assessment of property. Moreover, assessors could
and did for decades exercise political power far exceeding
their scope of authority. Since local governments are
financed largely through property taxation and the assessor
controls the base from which this revenue is raised, he can
exercise budgetary power statutorily given to county, city,
and school district officers:
After a unit of government has reached its maximum levy limitation, its
future budgetary policy is largely in the hands of the assessor. The
decision made in his office as to the percentage of market value that will
be used for assessment purposes is almost controlling. Moreover,
decisions made by the assessor are more apt to be influenced by
consideration of his political future than by the legitimate revenue
needs of local government. Thus we have the spectacle of the county
assessor, whose sole function is to find and value property at its full
value, charting the fiscal policy of most local governments. (Montana
Legislative Council, Property Taxation in M ontana, 1960, p. 31)

The legislature's struggles to limit and structure assessors'
discretion are not over, but its efforts over the past seventy
years have insured that 1) detailed procedures for assessment
are published in the Montana Administrative Code; 2) that
these procedures comply with legislative standards; and 3)
formalized procedures for citizens' participation in rulemaking and opportunities for appeals against assessments
exist. This paper will discuss the steps- and mis-steps-in the
process of obtaining the right mixture of statute, rule, and
discretion.

Between 1891 and 1977, Montana statute required that
"all taxable property must be assessed at its full cash value,"
which was defined as "the amount at which the property
would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a solvent
debtor" (84-401and84-101, R.C.M. 1947). This statute was
never, in its 74 year tenure, adhered to. County assessors
and, later, the State Board of Equalization evolved a system
of fractional assessment under which all property in the state
was assessed at some fraction of full cash value. As recently
as 1977, MAC rules required assessors to value business
inventories at 60% of dealer's cost, oil field machinery at 40%
of current market value, and airplanes at 66 2/ 3% of
wholesale value. This system of fractional assessment totally
disrupted legislative tax rates, drastically reduced local
governments' tax bases, and caused massive shifts in tax
burden.
This system of fractional assessment did not, in my
opinion, arise because the statutes were unnecessarily vague,
delegating authority without meaningful standards. The
legislature provided a standard for assessing ("full cash
value") and a definition of that standard. Statutes did not
specify methods for assessment but left that to assessors,
who would use their expertise and discretion to establish the
best methods of determining full cash value. Most state
legislatures and courts have concurred that such judgements
are an appropriate area for assessors' discretion. The
continued violation of the statute requiring assessment at
full cash value resulted not from careless delegation of
authority but from the structure of tax administration
established by the 1889 constitution.
Article XVI, section 5 created the office of assessor in each
county and provided for his local election. Statutes
implementing the section required him to find and assess all
taxable property in his county at "full cash value" (84-401
and 84-406). However, the necessity of getting elected every
four years provided .a strong temptation for assessors to
ignore this statute, particularly in view of the history of
county independence and the travelling distance from
Helena in the early days of statehood. The rewards for
underassessment were many: 1) taxpayers receiving an
individual "break'' on an assessment would be grateful; 2)
keeping assessments low would insure that statewide mills
raised the least possible revenue in that county and shifted
the tax burden to some other county; and 3) by lowering
assessments assessors would force city and county commissioners to raise mill levies in order to raise the same
amount of revenue, thus pushing the political liability of
taxes into their laps. Assessors would have been less than
human if they had not yielded to these pressures, since
taxpayers' hostility toward taxes usually settles, unfairly and
illogically, on assessors.
The legislature discovered how strong the temptation had
been when it appointed a Tax and License Commission in
1917 to determine why property assessments varied so
markedly from county to county. The Commission found
that the following average rates of assessment were
prevailing in the counties: land- 30% of full value; cattle- 45%
of full value; sheep-40% of full value; horses and mules-52%

of full value; and hogs- 18% of full value. The only property
assessed at the statutory level was the money belonging to
widows and orphans, which was revealed by court records.
Further, the Commission learned that these rates were set in
an annual meeting of county assessors who "resolved
themselves into a sort of legislative assembly and proceeded
to fix the values at which different species of property shall
be assessed."
Needless to say, these fractional assessments were in direct
conflict with statute and assessors were far exceeding their
statutory authority in setting such rates. What's more, this
extralegal "legislature" did not have much more success in
controlling its members than the legitimate legislature.
During the year between meetings, the assessors vied among
themselves for the most "competitive" assessments. The
Commission found in 1918 that assessments in different
counties for first class grain land ranged from $5.21 ro $47.29
per acre, first class hay land from $10 to $26.62 per acre,
work horses from $49 to $75.65, and dairy cows from $33.92
to $100.
After reviewing the gap between statute and practice, the
Commission concluded "that the present system . .. is a
failure and results in unjust discrimination and is utterly
inadequate." Believing that legislative control over assessment must be reasserted, the Commission recommended a
bill to the 1919 legislature that continued the assessment of
property at full cash value but dropped the tax rate to the
value county assessors were actually using for the various
types of property. To illustrate, the tax on a $1000 parcel of
land is calculated below according to the statutory method,
the method actually used by assessors in 1917, and the
proposed method:
I.
2.
3.
4.

Statutory method
Valued at 100%
Taxed at 100%
Multiplied by mills
Tax due = $200
($ IOOOx l00%x
100%x200m)

I.
2.
3.
4.

Actual practice, 1917
Valued at 30%
Taxed at 100%
Multiplied by mills
Tax due = $60
($1000x30%x
100%x200m)

I.
2.
3.
4.

Proposed method
Valued at 100%
Taxed at 30%
Multiplied by mills
Tax due = $60
($1OOOx 100%x
30%x200m)

The bill passed, creating seven classes of property taxed at
rates varying from 7% to 100% of the assessed value, which
was 100% of full cash value. The legislature, thus, in 1919
clearly recognized the dangers of allowing assessors the
discretion to set effective tax rates through extralegal
fractional assessments. It hoped to end this practice by
setting in statute both the standard of assessment and the tax
rate. In upholding the constitutionality of the new law, the
Montana Supreme Court noted that the chief purpose of the
bill was "to relieve administrative officers from the apparent
necessity of continuing the legal fiction of full valuation in
the face of contrary facts ." The court also affirmed in this
case that it was the legislature's duty to provide a uniform
system of assessment throughout the state. (Hilger v. Moore,
56 Mont. 146, 82 P. 477, 483 (1919)).
This was the first of several times in which the legislature
sought to control assessors by enacting their practice into
law. One could argue that the legislature, in having
2

legislation follow practice, was benefitting from the "creative
nibbling" theory of administrative law: the legislature had
given assessors sufficient discretion to investigate and chart a
new course, allowing them to create a solution to a large
problem by nibbling at individual cases. However, this was
not true in Montana's history of property tax assessment.
Assessors were not experimenting with the best way to
assess; rather, they were substituting their judgment for
legislators' on what the state's tax policies should be. The
legislature modelled statute on existing practice in this
instance only as an attempt to control future practice.
The legislature also took another step toward controlling
assessors at this time. The 1889 constitution created a threemember State Board of Equalization to "adjust and equalize
the valuation of the taxable property among the several
counties of the state." However, when the Board attempted
to raise assessments in one county to nearer the statutory full
cash value, the Supreme Court ruled that the Board had the
power to decrease assessments but not to increase them. The
1916 legislature placed a constitutional amendment on the
ballot to give the Board much broader power:

U.S. census data showed that assessors continued to drift
away from full cash value throughout the next decade,
despite admonitions from the Attorney General and the
Montana Supreme Court. In 1931, the court in State ex. rel.
Schoonover v. Stewart reiterated that statute requires that
"all taxable property must be assessed at its full cash value.
The section has not been change.ct since its enactment ... ;
and its mandate is the law today." Neither assessors nor the
Board had the power, the court said, to establish fractional
assessment.
The 1930's were, however, not a politic time to raise
assessments, particularly on farm land. As the Depression
deepened and more property taxes became delinquent,
assessments fell further and further from full cash value. By
1950, the average market value of an acre of irrigated farm
land in Montana was $99, but its average assessed value was
$32, less than it had been in 1921.
The State Board of Equalization expressed great concern
over these falling assessments and county assessors' neglect
of statute. In 1954, they informed the legislature that the
classification law

The state board of equalization shall adjust and equalize the valuation
of taxable property among the several counties, and the different
classes of taxable property in any county and in the several counties
and between individual taxpayers; supervise and review the acts of the
county assessors and the county boards of equalization; and exercise
such authority and do all things necessary to secure a fair, just, and
equitable valuation of all taxable property among counties, between
classes of property, and between individual taxpayers. (Article XII,
section 15)

is necessarily anchored to the full cash value provisions of section 84401, and when we deliberately cut loose from that anchor we begin to
drift. The administration of the law has so deteriorated over the years
that we now have ... a classification Jaw within a classification Jaw.
(Sixteenth Biennial Report)

However, the Board did not use its statutory authority to
correct the situation. Although the legislature had given it
power to adopt all necessary rules to govern assessors, the
Board issued no body of rules to guide assessors between
1923 and 1962. The Board did, with the assistance of the
assessors' professional association, compile assessment
guides and valuation schedules for various property and
distribute them to assessors, but it did not make their use
mandatory. Nor did the Board ever during these 40 years use
its power to begin proceedings against a county assessor who
violated state law by assessing at less than full cash value. In
fact, the Board itself violated this law by lowering
assessments to bring them down to the statewide average.
Even when the legislature passed a Reclassification and
Reappraisal Act in 1957 to bring residential property
assessments to full value, the Board and assessors determined what fraction of this new value would be used. A
legislative committee called this action "entirely unacceptable" and "beyond the power of the legislature to give the
State Board of Equalization the arbitrary power to require
(fractional assessment)," but it was uncertain how to correct
the situation. The committee finally decided that the only
way to control assessment was to establish fractional
assessment by statute. Members argued that legislators
would at least be aware of and consider what fraction of full
value was to be used under this system. However, the
subcommittee's proposed bill did not pass.

The electorate approved the amendment, which became
effective in 1917. In 1923, the legislature passed a bill
detailing and further broadening the Board's powers.
Notably, the Board was empowered "to prescribe rules and
regulations, not in conflict with the constitution and laws of
Montana, to govern county boards of equalization and the
assessors of the different counties in the performance of their
duties." Further, it could require the county attorney to start
proceedings against any assessor who violated statutory
assessment laws. The bill also established hearing
procedures for taxpayers' appeals against assessments and
for Board changes in assessment rules. (84-708)
Seemingly, the legislature in 1923 had gained control over
assessment by requiring assessors to exercise ministerial
level discretion within standards set by the legislature and
reviewed by the State Board of Equalization, which
exercised broad delegated quasi-legislative a~d quasijudicial authority within its area of expertise. However,
neither the statutory changes embodied in the 1919
classification law nor the 1917 constitutional amendment
touched the fundamental problem of tax assessment: county
assessors were still elected by local citizens and in direct
contact with them. The three-mel(lber Board and its small
staff were totally inadequate-and probably quite unwillingto police 56 county assessors. The Board limited itself to
hearing individual taxpayers' appeals from county equalization boards and lowering the assessment of whole classes of
property when one county varied too markedly from others.

By 1960, the county assessors and the State Board of
Equalization had totally usurped legislative control over
assessment. The Board's annual meeting with assessorsestablished by statute as a training session the Board held for
3

assessors-continued as a "legislature" in which tax policy
was set. The Board and assessors became local government
"budget watchers," who felt it was their duty to limit the
amount of tax cities and counties could raise under the
statutory maximum mill levies. A Board member later
testified before a Congressional committee investigating
Montana's assessment procedures that the Board's and
assessors' purpose was to alter existing statutory taxing and
bonding limitations by making them more restrictive than
contemplated by law. (Subcommittee on Intergovernmental
Relations hearing, Billings, 22 August 1972)
Even the Montana Supreme Court came to disregard the
legislature as the proper body to set standards for assessment
and taxation. In a 1965 decision, which extended and made
explicit a decision issued in 1960, the court held that the
State Board of Equalization had the constitutional authority
to compel fractional assessment of property and that
legislative control over the Board and assessment procedures
was "directory" only. The court based its decision on the
belief that the legislature and court had left the fractional
assessment rates used by the county assessors and the Board
unchallenged for so long that the practice had become
acceptable.
This decision was puzzling to many in light of the
legislature's past attempts to end fractional assessment and
the court's 1931 ruling (which stood until 1960) that
fractional assessment was illegal. However, the legal
profession's puzzlement over this decision was small
compared to citizen bewilderment when their tax assessment
notices arrived. Statute said that houses were assessed at
100% of full value and taxed at 30%, but the assessors and
the Board had arrived at an agreement that 40% of 95% of
the house's market value determined the house's assessed
value, to which was applied the statutory tax rate of 30% and
the mill levy. By law, a house valued at $10,000 should pay
$600 ifthe local mill levy was 200 ($10,000 x 30%x 200 mills),
but it actually paid only $228 ($10,000 x 95% x 40% x 30% x
200 mills). Most taxpayers assumed they had received a "tax
break" and left well enough alone, not realizing that
everyone was getting the same "break" and higher mills were
being levied to compensate. Had the taxpayer wished to
pursue the matter, he would have had difficulty. The rules of
assessment were not printed in any public document and
assessors were often reluctant to tell citizens the formula that
was used. One legislator reported that the State Board of
Equalization refused to tell even him what fractional
assessments were used!
Clearly, administrative discretion was almost unbounded
at this point. Citizens had superficial safeguards: they could
appeal their assessments through a procedure established by
statute. But they were not allowed to know the standards and
procedure used to determine the assessments. Such
safeguards were not, in fact, any safeguard at all.
Prodded by legislative outcry over this secrecy and
assured of judicial sanction for fractional assessment, the
Board did begin to publish its rules in the early 1960's and to
require that assessors follow them. While this was in one
sense a step toward structuring assessors' discretion, the

rules were in direct conflict with statute. Section 84-401 still
required all property to be assessed at 100% of full cash
value, while a Board rule published in 1962 directed
assessors to value agricultural land on its productive
capacity rather than its full cash value and a 1963 rule
ordered assessors to value all residential property at 40% of
full value. The 1962 rule lowered the taxable value of
agricultural land to 6% of market value, since productive
capacity averaged 20% of market value. Residential
property's taxable value under the Board's rule was 12%
(40% x 30%). The legislature had established the same tax for
both types of property, but the Board's rules had effectively
doubled the burden on residential property compared to
agricultural land.
When 26 assessors refused to follow the 1962 rule, the
Board brought an original proceeding in the Supreme Court
to force its use. The court held the rule invalid because the
Board had not held public hearings prior to its issue as
section 84-710 required, but the court did not question the
Board's authority to make such a rule directly conflicting
with statute. It is noteworthy that the Board's legislative
grant of authority to make substantive rules read: the Board
"may prescribe rules and regulations, not in conflict with the
constitution and laws of Montana ... "(emphasis added).
(84-708)
One observer commented forcefully on this "odd species
of administrative rule-making" in 1973:
The State Board of Equalization, by its alteration and disregard of the
legislature's statutory tax and spending policy, considers its legislative
rule-making power to be superior to that of the legislative branch of
government. Through the 40% rule the State Board has denominated
itself a "fourth branch" of state government.
(Sullivan, "Real Property Assessment in Montana," 34 Montana Law
Review 305)

So the matter stood in 1972 when the Constitutional
Convention met. The assessed value of agricultural land had
dropped 27% between 1925 and 1970, although real estate
sales showed a 300% increase. Residential property was
valued as low as 12% of market value in some counties and as
high as 32% in others. The Convention's Committee on
Revenue and Finance was, however, determined that this
situation should not continue. Its report asserted that:
The details of any tax administration system should be left to the
legislature, which is best qualified to develop the most efficient,
modern and fair system necessary for the needs of the day. Tax
administration should be established by the legislature and administered by the executive branch of government, not by a
constitutional board which is immune from control by the people. A
constitutionally enshrined board is less answerable for its activities and
is freer to ignore the mandates and directives of the legislative
assembly.

The Convention concurred. The new constitution omitted
any mention of the State Board of Equalization. Instead,
article VIII, section 3 provides "The state shall appraise,
assess, and equalize the valuation of all property which is to
be taxed in the manner provided by law." Section 4
reinforces the state's control by requiring that "All taxing
jurisdictions shall use the assessed valuation of property
4

Department rules required assessment at various fractional
rates.
A legislative subcommittee, appointed in 1975 to consider
the equity of the various tax rates contained in the property
tax classification system, discovered that the recent
amendments had done little to end the confusion surrounding property tax assessment. After studying the
Department's rules for several months, the subcommittee
found that 23 different tax rates were being applied to
property, instead of the 11 established by law. Members
concluded that the question of equity could not even be
approached until 1) the legislature knew what the effective
rate of tax (as modified by Department rules) was for each
type of property and 2) the legislature controlled both the
assessment rate and the tax rate. Members further concluded
that the standards of assessment and the procedures for
taxation must be simplified so that both legislators and
citizens would easily understand the basis of taxation when
they began discussing the difficult question of equity among
the classes.
With these objectives in mind, the subcommittee
recommended changes in both the standard of assessment
and the tax rates. It substituted "market value"for "full cash
value" as the standard for assessing since market value "is
one of the few concepts of value with a concrete meaning,
understood by all persons who buy and sell goods." The
subcommittee's bill removed property that is rarely sold
from this requireme'nt and provided an alternate, welldefined standard of assessment for each case. Hoping to end
the days of fractional assessment forever, the subcommittee
clearly defined market value and included in its bill the
provision that "the Department of Revenue or its agents may
not adopt a lower or different standard of value from market
value (except as expressly exempted) in making the official
assessment and appraisal of the value of property ... "(84401 ). The bill then dropped the tax rates for property to the
effective rates the Department was setting through its rules.
Thus, a car, which under the existing system was assessed (by
rule) at 66 2/3% of market value and taxed at 20% (statute),
had an effective tax rate of 13.3%. The subcommittee's bill
raised the assessment level to 100% of market value and set
the tax rate at 13.3%. The bill's intent was to keep the tax rate
the same for all types of property as it had been under the
then-existing rules.
The Department of Revenue firmly supported the bill
during the session, seeking law that would end its anomalous
position by giving legislative mandate to raise assessments to
full value. The bill passed the House 94 to 1 and the Senate 47
to 0. The Department is revising its administrative rules and
valuation schedules to comply with this new law. The
legislature's Revenue Oversight Committee has reviewed
most of these rules to determine whether they are consistent
with legislative intent. Committee members are currently
studying the equity of the tax rates set in the property tax
classification system, confident that they understand the
effective rates of taxation and control them.
Thus, for the third time, the legislature has changed
statute to reflect administrative practice. As a study of

established by the state." The next legislature implemented
these provisions by designating the assessors as "agents of
the department of revenue" and stating that "The department of revenue shall have full charge of assessing all
property subject to taxation and equalizing values ... "(84402)
The new constitution at last resolved the basic problem of
property tax assessment administration: assessors, while still
elected, are now agents of the state and must follow
assessment procedures set by the Department of Revenue.
Instead of a three-member Board with a small staff
overseeing assessors' decisions, the Department of Revenue
can use its large trained staff to assist and supervise local
assessors.
The legislature was finally in a position to control the
standard of assessment as well as the tax rate. The 1973
legislature did not, however, rise to the challenge. Fearing to
do "too much too fast," the legislature gave the Department
of Revenue the power in statute which the former State
Board of Equalization had by constitutional amendment
(Article XII, Section 15). This was the section upon which
the Supreme Court based its argument that the Board had
the power to establish fractional assessments. A bill to
require that "all taxable property must be assessed at its full
cash value and not at any percentage thereof' did not get out
of committee.
The Department of Revenue was, understandably,
reluctant to take the giant step of raising all assessments to
full cash value without a clear legislative mandate. The
passage of the 1973 act seemed to be a mandate for quite the
opposite-continued fractional assessment. In late 1972 and
early 1973, the Department promulgated over 50 pages of
rules in the newly-established Montana Administrative
Code, containing the written and unwritten rules the Board
of Equalization had used. These rules were all based on a
fractional assessment of full cash value.
The legislature itselfadopted some of the Board's rules of
fractional assessment, enacting them into statute. The 1973
session amended 84-401 to read "All taxable property must
be assessed at its full cash value except the assessment of
agricultural land shall be based upon the productive capacity
of the land when valued for agricultural purposes ... "
Supporters argued that the reduced tax rate the Board had
granted agricultural land might help conserve it. Two years
later, the legislature further amended the section by enacting
the Bo_a rd's 40% rule: "All taxable real property must be
assessed at 20% ofits full cash value ... "The Department of
Revenue had requested the amendment because one large
county refused to recognize the Department's rule that real
property must be assessed at 40% of its full cash value and
taxed at 30%, which was to its taxpayers' definite advantage
in school equalization funding.
By passing these amendments, the legislature at last
formally recognized in statute fractional assessment. The
amendments increased legislative control in that both the
standard of assessment and the tax rate were set in statute.
However, personal property continued in its legal limbo. No
standard for its assessment was set in statute, but
5

predictable tax policy. In essence, the legislature had to
compromise with the existing practice before it could gain
the control necessary to structure assessors' discretion.

"realities about the administration of government
programs," the history of property tax assessment may be
rare in having statute flow from administrative policymaking rather than legislative policy-making direct administrative procedures. However, all government programs
involve a mixture of statute, rule, and discretion. If
programs are to meet changing conditions, statutes must be
changed as administrator's find new circumstances and
legislators formulate new policy. Citizens' needs for open,
predictable, and useful law can be met when legislators
exercise control over agencies by carefully structuring
administrative responsibility and by reviewing agency rules
and agencies, in their turn, inform legislators of changing
circumstances and gaps between theory and practice.
In the case of property tax assessment, legislatorsfrustrated by trying to change tax policy when they didn't
have control over the most basic element (assessment), but
mindful of the profound economic effect of requiring
assessors to meet the letter of the law after nearly a century of
fractional assessment-had to recognize that two steps were
necessary before the situation could be resolved. The
structure of tax administration had to be changed so that
assessors and the Department were obligated to follow
legislative decision and, secondly, the legislature had to
enact into law what assessors were actually doing. This gave
the legislature control over property tax assessment and
procedure without risking citizens' need for continuing,

Now, it appears that the correct mixture of statute, rule,
and discretion exists in the property tax assessment
program. The legislature has established clear standards of
assessment. The Department of Revenue has the authority
to adopt substantive rules, detailing the best methods of
assessment. Assessors may use their judgement within these
standards and rules to value individual property. If the rules
are inadequate to value certain property, assessors can
report this to the Department. The Department can request
legislation if a gap between statute and reality develops. The
legislature, in its turn, can review the Department's rules,
evaluate its administration of the statutes, and seek itsI
advice. This system seems to incorporate the necessary
checks on power while offering a chance for growth in the
law to meet changing circumstances.
However, active cooperation and vigilance by each branch
of government is still necessary. Montana has a century-long
history of conflict between statute and administrative
practice in property tax assessment. Whether the recent
changes, designed to structure the discretion exercised by the
Department of Revenue and the county assessors, are
sufficient to prolong the past year's harmony between statute
and rule into a new century remains to be seen.
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